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Abstract: 
In August 2009 the African finance ministers issued the Freetown Declaration, in 
which they committed their governments to “implement fiscal stimulus measures” 
to counter the effects of the international financial crisis on their economies.  This 
paper analyzes the feasibility of realizing this commitment. It considers the 
availability of policy instruments in the sub-Saharan countries for countercyclical 
intervention.  On the basis of this, the paper proposes a fiscal stimulus tailored to 
the conditions and constrains of the countries of the region.  In a majority of the 
countries the fiscal expansion could be financed domestically, in other countries 
governments would require additional external funding, and only for a few 




The Freetown Declaration:  Countercyclical Policy for Africa1 
 
1. Introduction 
 In August 2009 the Caucus of African Governors of the IMF, World Bank and 
African Development Bank (also known as the Caucus of African Finance Ministers) 
met in Freetown, Sierra Leone.2  Responding to crisis in the international economy, 
the meeting unanimously issued the Freetown Declaration, in which they collectively 
committed themselves to implement a fiscal stimulus and called for the international 
agencies to support it.3 
 This paper considers the feasibility of a fiscal stimulus for the sub-Saharan 
countries, most of which are low-income and exporters of primary products.  Section 
2 reviews the policy recommendations in the Freetown Declaration relevant to a fiscal 
stimulus.  Section 3 presents the algebra of a stimulus and uses this to demonstrate the 
effect of loan and grant conditionalities on policy options.  Section 4 considers in 
detail the policy instruments available to sub-Saharan governments to implement 
effectively a stimulus program.  The final section indicates how donors and lenders 
could support countercyclical fiscal policy by the governments of the region. 
 
2.  Recovery Program in the Freetown Declaration  
 In late April 2009 at the spring meeting of the development committee of the 
IMF and the World Bank, the president of the African Development Bank warned that 
the sub-Saharan countries would be severely affected by the global financial crisis 
that had begun the previous year.4  When the African finance ministers met in 
Freetown in mid-August his warning had been realized.  In this context the ministers 
                                                 
1 This paper benefited from comments by Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University when an 
earlier version was presented at the meeting of the African Taskforce in Pretoria in July 2009, 
and from Samura Kamara, Minister of Finance of Sierra Leone.  It based on the author’s 
keynote address to the Caucus of African Governors of the IMF, World Bank, African 
Development Bank, Sierra Leone, 12-13 August 2009. 
2 This is an annual meeting of finance ministers to discuss the issues which would arise at the 
subsequent IMF-World Bank meeting, which in October 2009 was held in Istanbul. 
3 The declaration was adopted on 12 August 2009, by the Caucus of African Governors of the 
IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank. Henceforth cited as (CAG 2009).  Found 
at http://www.mofed.gov.sl/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=99. 
4 The warning included the prediction that, “It will certainly take African countries a longer 




and their representatives issued a declaration unusual for its clarity, forcefulness and 
break with prevailing policy.   
 Unlike previous declarations that had pledged the governments to orthodox 
policies of macro stability and institutional reform,5 after noting the need for sound 
policy and social ‘safety nets’, the Freetown Declaration issued a bold declaration,  
We, the African Governors to the BWIs and AfDB, commit to… 
Implement fiscal stimulus measures where appropriate to weather the impact 
of the global economic downturn;  
Expand high-growth yielding public investments…to restore and raise our 
countries growth and employment potential as well as crowd-in private 
investment; 
Implement monetary policies that support the short-term fiscal stimulus 
measures… 
Remain prepared to exit from the countercyclical fiscal stimulus policies as 
soon as the macroeconomic conditions permit. (CAG 2009) 
 
 These commitments, if implemented, would represent a break with the 
standard IMF macroeconomic framework that stresses minimizing fiscal deficits and a 
tight monetary stance to achieve low inflation, usually single digit.  The commitment 
to a fiscal stimulus would imply a lower fiscal surplus for a few countries and for 
most it would mean a larger deficit.  More fundamentally, the commitment to a 
stimulus implies using the deficit as part of an active fiscal policy rather than as a 
problem to be reduced.   
 The commitment to increase public investment has three policy implications 
that are potentially inconsistent with orthodox macro policy.  First, it asserts the 
public sector as an active driver of growth rather than merely establishing the 
framework for private sector driven growth.  Second, the IMF and World Bank view 
that public borrowing ‘crowds out’ private investment is explicitly reversed:  the 
Declaration asserts that public investment, which would by necessity be financed 
through borrowing, can ‘crowd-in’ private investment.6  Third, it provides an implicit 
strategy for an active fiscal policy: countercyclical intervention will be used to 
                                                 
5 For example, the declaration of October 2007 referred to “wide array of far-reaching 
reforms to achieve macroeconomic stability”.  The full text of the statement is found at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21520315~pagePK:
34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
6 A case for public investment as a driver of poverty reducing growth is found in Roy and 
Weeks (2004).  The orthodox view that public investment crowds out private is stated without 
nuance at http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/a-fiscal-stimulus-for-africa. 
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stabilize output near potential, and public investment will foster higher growth rates 
through increased productive capacity. 
 A further break with Washington Consensus macro policy is made by the 
commitment to use monetary policy to support the active fiscal policy.  While policy 
consistency requires that fiscal and monetary measures be coordinated, an 
accommodating monetary policy contradicts one of the basic tenets of most IMF 
programs, inflation targeting, as well as associated limits on money growth.7  Even 
more fundamental, committing monetary policy to support fiscal policy renders it 
derivative from fiscal policy, a return to so-called Keynesian macro management.  
Finally, the commitments explicitly emphasize the fiscal stimulus as countercyclical 
and short term by specifying the need to exit from it as economies recover. 
 After stating the recovery program, the Freetown Declaration presents a list of 
‘requests’ for the multilateral development agencies of which they are governors, 
To this end [the fiscal stimulus], African IMF/WBG Governors urge the 
International Monetary Fund to 
• Support our policy frameworks [and give] us the needed policy space…to 
leverage [external] resources… 
• Facilitate expeditious access to the newly created financing instruments; 
• Mobilize additional resources to allow an increase in concessional lending 
while ascertaining that these new instruments are fully funded; 
• Promptly activate the precautionary component of the SCF [Special Credit 
Facility]. 
We ask the World Bank Group to introduce more flexible and adaptable 
budget support instrument that is capable of responding quickly to crisis. 
 
 The second, third and fourth requests of the IMF are derivative from the first, 
allowing governments the flexibility, ‘policy space’, to design and implement their 
programs.  The request of the IMF for “expeditious access” and of the World Bank for 
“more flexible and adaptable budget support” reflects a general view among the 
officials at the Caucus of tardiness by the Fund and the Bank in their response to the 
impact of the global crisis on African countries. 
 The Freetown Declaration represented a clear break from the macro policy 
framework common to most African countries prior to the international financial 
crisis of 2008.  This macroeconomics of this framework combined with a cautious 
monetary stance and a neutral fiscal policy, in the context of market deregulation.  
This policy approach, based on a “price constrained framework”, has as its 
                                                 
7 This is demonstrated analytically in Section 3. 
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prerequisite that the world economy operates near its potential.8  From mid-2008 it 
was clear that aggregate demand was insufficient to permit the world economy to 
achieve its potential.  In response governments of the major industrial countries 
introduced “stimulus packages” designed to replace the fall in private demand with 
public expenditure. 
 In this demand constrained world economy, African governments have two 
general policy options.  They could pursue a “business-as-usual, hope-for-the-best” 
option in which they continue with the policy framework designed for a robust world 
economy and await international recovery.  This would follow advice to place 
primary emphasis in macro policy on “stability”, which in IMF terminology means 
preventing inflation, reaching targets for fiscal deficits, and maintaining a free-
floating exchange rate.9  It does not mean stabilizing output by policy intervention.   
 However, the crisis may have brought a degree of change in IMF policy 
advice.  A January 2009 IMF report on the world economy called for a “firm 
commitment” to a “timely implementation of fiscal stimulus across a broad 
range of advanced and emerging economies”.  In line with this commitment, a May 
2009 press release reported that the IMF recommended a fiscal stimulus for a low 
income country, Mozambique.10  In its survey of the impact of the financial crisis, the 
                                                 
8 An early use of this terminology is in Liejonhufvud (1968, Section 2).  The theoretical and 
policy difference between “price constrained” and “quantity constrained” economies is 
discussed in Weeks (1989).  The recently revised edition of that book can be found at 
http://jweeks.org. 
9 A clear statement of this approach is found in an IMF report on the global financial crisis, 
Countries should focus on macroeconomic stability. In some countries with falling 
inflation there may be scope for monetary easing; others, however, still experience 
continued or renewed price pressures. Those with flexible exchange rates should allow 
them to move, so that they function as shock absorbers. (IMF 2009a, viii) 
10 The complete IMF statement on fiscal policy reads as follows, 
In current circumstances, the timely implementation of fiscal stimulus across a broad 
range of advanced and emerging economies must provide a key support to world 
growth.  Given that the current projections are predicated on strong and coordinated 
policy actions, any delays will likely worsen growth prospects. Countries that have 
policy room should make a firm commitment to do more if the situation deteriorates 
further. Fiscal stimulus packages should rely primarily on temporary measures and be 
formulated within medium-term fiscal frameworks that ensure that the envisaged 
build up in fiscal deficits can be reversed as economies recover and that fiscal 
sustainability can be attained in the face of demographic pressure. (IMF 2009c, 1) 
 A press release titled “IMF Mission Calls for Fiscal Stimulus in Mozambique” states, 
“In the short term, given Mozambique’s low level of public debt, the [IMF] mission sees 
scope to at least partly offset the impact of the global economic crisis on Mozambique with 
somewhat more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.” (IMF 2009d).  The IMF 
approved higher deficit limits for El Salvador and Ethiopia (Bretton Woods Project 2009, 9) 
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World Bank also recommended that governments “assess their ability to undertake 
countercyclical policies”.11  The African Development Bank as well recommended 
countercyclical fiscal intervention.12  Without explicitly mentioning countercyclical 
measures, in 2009 the IMF recommended for Sierra Leone that the country’s fiscal 
deficit be allowed to increase to respond to the impact of the financial crisis on import 
prices.13  None the less, a commitment to the pre-crisis orthodoxy remains among 
professionals in the Bretton Woods institutions.14 
 
3. Countercyclical Fiscal Policy: Analytical framework 
 3.1 Countercyclical Algebra 
 For success a countercyclical policy package must be consistent with a 
sustainable balance of payments and manageable inflation.  Achieving the appropriate 
balance requires careful use of available policy instruments. As shown in the next 
section, in most sub-Saharan countries monetary policy is not effective except to 
accommodate fiscal policy.  This reduces the stimulus tools to policy and exchange 
rate management.  With underutilized resources both measures should stimulate 
output.  This section considers the algebra of a stimulus package for countries in 
which both instruments can be used.  The next section considers a strictly fiscal 
stimulus for countries locked into fixed exchange rate arrangements. 
 Both devaluation and fiscal expansion have potentially negative effects that 
require careful management.  Since the income elasticity of taxes is typically less than 
unity in sub-Saharan countries, increasing government expenditure will always 
increase the fiscal deficit relatively to national income.  Simultaneously there would 
                                                 
11 “The challenge for policymakers in this environment is to assess their ability to undertake 
countercyclical policies given the resources available to them as well as their institutional and 
administrative capacity to rapidly expand and adapt existing programs.” (WB 2009, 10) 
12 The African Development Bank’s 2009 report calls on donors and lenders to “[Focus] on 
results, rather than prescribing rigid policies and actions, allowing countries space to respond 
according to their particular needs and circumstances”.  More specific, it recommends that 
donors and governments “[i]ncrease flexibility in macroeconomic frameworks to allow more 
scope to balance macroeconomic stability and the need to stimulate domestic demand”. (ADB 
2009, 2) 
13 “[IMF] Staff is proposing that the primary fiscal deficit be revised upward by 0.4 
percentage points of GDP to accommodate the unanticipated budget impact of the rise in 
world oil prices.” (IMF 2009b, 5). 
14 In his personal blog in early 2010 the World Bank chief economist for Africa, Shanta 
Devarajan, argued against a fiscal stimulus “for Africa” on the grounds that increasing a fiscal 
deficit would result in inflation or a reduction in private investment (“crowding out”) or both.  
http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/a-fiscal-stimulus-for-africa. 
 6
be an increased and possibility unsustainable trade deficit.  The policy goal is to 
prevent the latter through devaluation, which has its own problem, the inflation it 
generates. 
 Identifying the appropriate balance between increased expenditure and 
devaluation is facilitated by use of algebra.  The rate of growth of the real demand for 
output (y) for a time period can be specified as the weighted sum of the growth of 
autonomous expenditures times the multiplier:  
 y = β[a1i + a2g + a3x - a4z],  Σai = 1 
The lower case letters i, g, x and z are the rates of change of expenditures that 
are exogenous with respect to national income, including the exchange-rate-induced 
components of trade (private investment, government expenditure, exports, and 
imports, respectively).  The ai terms are the shares in national income of each variable 
and β is the multiplier.  Exports have an autonomous component whose rate of 
change is xo, and a component determined by the real exchange rate.  Imports are a 
function of national income and the real exchange rate.  Define εx and εz as the 
elasticities of exports and imports with respect to the real exchange rate, p as the price 
level and δ  the marginal propensity to import: 
 x = xo + εxe* 
 z = δy - εze*  
 The change in the real exchange rate (e*) is the change in the nominal rate (e) 
minus the rate of inflation (p).  The ceterius paribus rate of inflation is the pass-
through rate of a devaluation (the marginal propensity to import, δ). 
 e* = e – p = e – δe = (1- δ)e 
 x = xo + εx(1 – δ)e 
 z = δy - εz(1 – δ)e 
 These can be substituted into the growth of demand equation.  We interpret xo 
as an external shock to export demand, and assume that it causes depressed 
expectations that render the growth of private investment zero.  Assume that the 
government seeks to prevent national income from falling (y = 0).  To simplify, write 
a3/a2 as α and define (εx + εy) = εT.  If the trade elasticities are positive, (εT > 0), a 
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real devaluation improves the trade balance (Marshall-Lerner condition).15  For zero 
growth, the real demand equation is: 
 0 = a2g + a3xo + a3εT(1 - δ)e 
 For any shock to exports (xo) the relationship between the change in 
expenditure and the devaluation is determined by three parameters, the ratio of 
exports to government expenditure, the real exchange rate elasticity of trade, and the 
propensity to import.  If the exchange rate is constant, the government expenditure 
that stabilizes output is: 
 g = αxo  
 For no increase in government expenditure, stabilizing output requires the 
nominal devaluation to be: 
 e = xo/[εT(1 - δ)] 
 The relationship between e and g for zero growth is shown in the upper right 
quadrant of Figure 1.  The upper left quadrant relates the nominal exchange rate to its 
inflationary effect (e and p), and the lower left quadrant links the change in the real 
exchange rate to the trade deficit (e* and X-Z).16  An export shock decreases national 
income and increases the trade deficit.  We assume that the government must return to 
the initial trade deficit within one time period or suffer an unsustainable loss of 
reserves.  Regaining the initial trade deficit requires a real devaluation of e*1, which 
implies a nominal devaluation of e1.  This sets the lower limit of the devaluation, 
which defines a feasible range for the increase of government expenditure to prevent a 
fall in output (g > g1).   
 Two other goals of the government constrain policy, inflation and deficit 
limits.  In Figure 1 in the upper right quadrant there is a feasible policy range, below 
the ‘inflation limit’ and above the “deficit limit”.  If the acceptable inflation rate is 
below p1, then no combination of devaluation and increased expenditure is consistent 
with restoring the trade balance and stabilizing output in the short run, though it 
would be possible with a series of devaluations in the medium term.  This 
demonstrates the necessity for exchange rate management.  Leaving the currency to 
                                                 
15 The more familiar condition of greater than unity refers to the nominal exchange rate and 
export and import values. 
16 Figure 1 is a simplified presentation.  It does not include the effect of changes in national 
income on import demand. 
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float when expenditure increases can result in excessive inflation as the depreciation 
seeks balance of trade sustainability.  If the limit for the fiscal deficit were below what 
would be generated by expenditure increase g1, there might remain a feasible short 
term region involving a low expenditure increase and a large devaluation.   
 If at the initial conditions the fiscal deficit is close to that set by donor and 
lender conditionality and/or the inflation rate is near its conditionality limit, the 
government has no space for a policy response to the export shock.  It is this policy 
constrained situation that the Freetown Declaration sought to avoid by requesting 
more policy space from the IMF and other donors and lenders. 
 
Figure 1: Policy Options for countercyclical intervention 
 
 
 3.2 Countercyclical Deficit Finance 
 Countercyclical policy increases demand when the economy grows below its 
long run potential, and decreases it when output encounters resource scarcities that 
provoke inflationary pressure.  This output stabilization policy maintains an economy 
as close to its potential as is consistent with other goals of policymakers.  It is not a 
growth policy, which would involve public investment to contribute to increasing 
productive capacity. 
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 To be relevant for the low income countries of sub-Saharan Africa, 
countercyclical intervention requires concrete specification.  Reducing taxes would be 
relatively ineffective because of the nature of the revenue generation.  In low income 
countries personal income taxes are rarely important, with most revenue from taxes 
on internal commerce, international trade and corporations.17  Almost all the company 
tax is collected from foreign enterprises engaged in extractive activities, and reducing 
their taxes would have little impact on their domestic investment decisions.   
 The alternative to tax reduction, enhancing demand by public expenditure, 
requires that the increases are flexible enough to be initiated quickly when there is a 
demand shock, and terminated with similar dispatch as the economy approaches its 
potential.  Public investments do not meet this condition because of their relatively 
long and inflexible construction time.  Much of current expenditure is also inflexible.  
For example, it might be possible to increase the number of school teachers if trained 
people were available, but it might not be rational to terminate them when the 
economy approaches its potential.   If it were judged rational from an educational 
point of view, it night prove politically difficult. 
 Because of the inappropriateness of capital expenditure and much of current 
expenditure of countercyclical intervention, government could base stimulus 
programs in the sub-Saharan countries on temporary employment schemes, ‘cash for 
work’.  Appropriate projects would be rapidly-completed activities using employment 
intensive techniques that have a large component of repair and maintenance.18  
Examples of such programs are digging sanitation ditches, repair of public buildings, 
environmental improvement through erosion reduction, and clearing of rural 
footpaths.  These activities were implemented in 2009 throughout Sierra Leone by the 
National Commission for Social Action as part of a countercyclical policy (Weeks 
2009d).  The projects would make a contribution to community welfare, though their 
                                                 
17 The World Bank data base World Development Indicators gives disaggregated tax statistics 
for twenty sub-Saharan countries in the 2000s.  For all but two trade taxes were at least 
twenty percent of revenue.  The exceptions were South Africa and the Republic of Congo.  
Sales taxes accounted for thirty percent or more for eleven of the twenty countries.  Personal 
and company taxes brought in twenty percent or more of revenue in only four of the countries 
(Ghana, Kenya, South Africa and Zambia).  The source provides no information for the major 
petroleum exporters, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sudan.  
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/ 
18 The International Labor Organization calls such projects as “labor-intensive public works”.  
The ILO website provides further information on short term employment programs. 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/recon/eiip/index.htm 
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primary purpose is to increase aggregate demand through the expenditures of those 
directly and indirectly employed.  To be effective, the employment schemes would 
have the following characteristics: 
1) identified and “stock-piled” prior to the need for them, with accounting 
procedures in place to reduce the likelihood of misuse of funds; 
2) easily initiated and quickly terminated, implying that they should be 
implemented by the central government in order to avoid delays due to limited 
administrative capacity of local governments; and 
3) wages and salaries are the major element of expenditure, with a low capital 
component. 
 Some issues that plague public works projects with controversy need not be 
relevant for ones whose purpose is countercyclical.  For example, the wage at which 
workers are paid is a secondary consideration because these are not long term or even 
medium term employment schemes.  The appropriate wage will vary across countries 
and regions, guided by the principle that the primary purpose of the projects is to 
increase demand quickly.  This would be best achieved by hiring as many people as 
possible, which implies paying wages at or below prevailing rates.  These programs 
would be introduced when the labor is in excess supply, thus unlikely to affect 
prevailing wage rates.  A ministry of finance study in Sierra Leone recommended this 
type of employment program as a policy measure to counter the effects of the 
financial crisis (MoFED-EPRU 2009).19 
 Clear rules should be established for the initiation and termination of 
countercyclical projects.  A “countercyclical” expenditure that becomes permanent 
negates its purpose.  Initiation and termination could be triggered by a policy rule 
based on appropriate macroeconomic indicators.  The specific indicator will vary by 
country, determined by the development and structure of the economy.   Among sub-
Saharan countries, only in South Africa are employment statistics sufficiently current 
and reliable to serve as a trigger indicator.  In other countries, almost all of which lack 
                                                 
19 In Sierra Leone the most important cash for work project in 2009 was supported by US$ 4 
million from the World Bank.  It employed about 14,000 people in infrastructure 
maintenance.     
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quarterly data on aggregate output, a proxy based on trade statistics could be 
constructed.20 
 As shown in the next section, external support in addition to current aid levels 
would be required to support a stimulus in some countries.  Its unfortunate but the 
case that donor funding does not lend itself to countercyclical programs because of 
the fixed, but often unreliable, schedule of allocation and disbursement.21  To make 
their funding more appropriate for countercyclical programs, donors should accelerate 
disbursement and adjust their allocation procedures to allow for an “aid fund” 
analogous to national mechanisms created for resource booms.  Money could be 
drawn from such a fund when the economy is below potential, and “hoarded” when 
near full potential.  Donor grants ear-marked for investment could not be used for 
countercyclical expenditures, for reasons explained above.  As a result, domestic 
public borrowing would be necessary to fund a stimulus, the practicality of which is 
discussed in the next section. 
 Two technical arguments are presented to justify abandoning fiscal policy for 
economic management:  the possible inflationary effect of deficits, and the putative 
tendency for public borrowing to “crowd out” private by causing interest rates to rise.  
We first consider the relationship between public deficits and inflationary pressures is 
analytically straight-forward.   
 An increase in spending from any source results in a reduction of expenditure 
of another type if an economy is at full potential.  If the expenditure is by the public 
sector, its inflationary impact will depend on how it is financed.  The expenditure can 
be financed through borrowing by sales of government securities to the private sector 
(“open market operations”) or by the ministry of finance borrowing from the central 
bank (“monetizing the deficit”).  An increase in a public deficit is not inflationary if 
financed by bond sales to the private sector, because the net change in the money 
supply is zero.  The government takes money out of circulation by the bond sale, and 
returns the same amount to circulation through its increased expenditure.  Assuming 
                                                 
20 In a study of Sierra Leone quarterly export revenue and government expenditure were used 
to estimate quarterly GDP (Weeks 2009d). 
21 At the annual Caucus of African governors of the IMF, World Bank and African 
Development Bank held in Freetown in August 2009, a frequent criticism of IMF and World 
Bank practice by ministers was the slow-disbursing nature of lending and grant programs.  
This criticism was directed specifically at three programs of the IMF, the Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF), the Stand-by Credit Facility (SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).  The 
ECF replaced the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 
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that the private sector holds its desired amount of bonds before the additional public 
borrowing, the government must offer the bonds above the prevailing interest rate.  If 
the increased bond rate transmits to private financial markets and investment is 
sensitive to interest rates, “crowding out” results.  In contrast, if the government 
borrows directly from the central bank, the money supply increases and inflation 
results, with an important exception.  In an open economy part of the increased money 
in circulation will be spent on imports, reducing the inflationary impact, but creating 
or increasing a trade deficit. 
 If the economy is operating at less than full potential, neither type of deficit 
financing should generate more than minor and transitory inflation, though “crowding 
out” could occur.  More government expenditure financed by bond sales to the private 
sector would bring a net increase in aggregate demand.  As before, no change in the 
money supply occurs.  Also as before, if the public held their desired amount of 
government debt prior to the bond sale, the new issues must be at a higher interest 
rate, creating upward pressure on private interest rates, depressing private investment 
expenditure.  The net change in aggregate demand would be positive and less than the 
increase in public expenditure unless private investment is extremely interest rate 
elastic, which is extremely unlikely in the sub-Saharan region.  Financing the 
expenditure by direct borrowing from the central bank would not require a higher 
bond rate.  The increase in aggregate demand would equal the increase in public 
expenditure, and monetizing the deficit generates an increase in the money supply 
sufficient to circulate the increased output that results from more public expenditure. 
 Few sub-Saharan countries have sufficiently developed bond markets to allow 
for effective open market operations (see next section).  In the absence of an effective 
secondary bond market the major motivation of commercial banks to hold public 
bonds is statutory requirements on the composition of reserves.  This implies that high 
interest rates are required to induce banks to purchase bonds beyond their legal 
obligation.  The absence of a secondary market and high yields on public bonds 
means that financing deficits by bond sales has the perverse effect of discouraging 
commercial banks from funding productive investments, which are riskier than 
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holding government securities.22  A second major effects of high interest rates is to 
increase the cost of servicing the domestic public debt.  
 With the economy well below its potential, monetizing the deficit is an 
effective tool for the expansion of aggregate demand, generating neither inflation nor 
“crowding out” of private expenditure.  The government’s expenditures on 
infrastructure could be consciously designed to “crowd in” private investment by 
lowering costs of transport, electricity and water supply.23  In many African countries, 
Zambia, for example, the increased cost of servicing the public debt as a result of 
bond sales should be a greater concern than inflation or “crowding out”.    
 
 3.4. Exchange Rate Management 
 Fiscal expansion, by increasing output and private demand, will increase 
imports and generate a trade deficit or make an existing deficit larger.  This is one of 
the problems that undermined the use of active fiscal policy in developing countries in 
the past and discredited it as an instrument of macro management, especially in Latin 
America in the 1970s.  Exchange rate depreciation or devaluation can be used to 
counter the tendency of fiscal expansion to create an unsustainable trade balance.   
 Thus, depreciation or devaluation is an intended part of a countercyclical 
policy, and causes a rise in the domestic price level equal to at least the “pass-through 
rate” (marginal propensity to import) times the change in the nominal exchange rate.  
While necessary and intended, this exchange rate induced increase in the price level 
creates the risk of destabilizing inflation if the nominal devaluation is large.  
Managing this risk is an essential part of a successful active fiscal policy. 
 As fashion moved against active fiscal policy over the last three decades, there 
was a shift to a view that “flexible” exchange rates were the only practical policy 
choice for governments.  Therefore, it is necessary to explain why exchange rate 
management by African governments would be both feasible and possible as part of 
                                                 
22 This process is discussed in detail for Zambia in Weeks, et. al. (2006). This represents what 
might be called “bank squeezing out”.  The typical use of the term “crowding out” refers to a 
fall in private investment that results from government borrowing that pushes up interest 
rates, discussed in the previous section.  More relevant in sub-Saharan countries is the 
decision by private banks not to lend because the risk-adjusted return on public bonds is 
greater than that for lending to private non-financial borrowers.  The return on public bonds is 
high because of the oligopsonistic power of private banks in sub-Saharan countries. 
23 An example is the repair of the Bumbuna hydroelectric site, which could greatly reduce 
power cuts and private generators in Sierra Leone, especially Freetown.  See  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDEVCOMMENG/Resources/sierraleone.pdf 
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policy to counter the global crisis.24  In practice almost all governments intervene in 
foreign exchange markets.25  The policy choice is not between “fixed” and “flexible” 
exchange rate regimes, but selection of the most appropriate point on a range of forms 
and degrees of intervention in the context of the characteristics of the economy 
(Fischer 2001).  Governments and central banks repeatedly shift between “flexible” 
and “fixed” exchange rates.26  Any time a central bank intervenes to moderate the rise 
or fall of the national currency it is “fixing” the exchange rate, however briefly. 
 The exchange rate management that would be part of the proposed stimulus 
package would not seek to maintain a “fixed” rate for the domestic currency against 
any foreign currency.  The purpose of the intervention would be to control the rate of 
depreciation of the national currency against the currencies of major trading partners 
in order to prevent a widening of the trade gap as the economy expanded and prevent 
excessive weakening that would stimulate unmanageable inflation.  The exchange rate 
managers would face two possible contexts, one in which the fiscal expansion was 
accompanied by no “weakening” of their currency and another in which fiscal 
expansion automatically provokes depreciation.27   
 The devaluation case occurs if there is no market pressure to weaken the 
national currency as public expenditure increases.  The government must act directly 
on the exchange rate, to raise the price of tradables, which will reduce import demand 
and raise the return to exporters.  The mechanism for exchange rate management will 
differ with the characteristics of financial and foreign exchange markets in each 
country.  In effect, the government would temporarily be implementing a “crawling 
peg” exchange rate regime.   The depreciation case occurs if the fiscal expansion is 
                                                 
24 An argument in favor of a return to managed exchange rates is found in Rolnick and 
Webber (1989), who write, “[W]e maintain there is a convincing case that a fixed exchange 
rate system is feasible and should be established. Theory shows it feasible, and overlooked 
empirical evidence shows it possible.” 
25 The IMF categorizes countries by exchange rate regime, and the Annual Report for 2007 
lists only thirty-five out of over 150 as having an “independently floating” exchange rate.  
Only two were in the sub-Saharan region, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.  The 
listing of the latter seems an anomaly because Somalia has no government and no currency.  
Another anomaly is the absence of Sierra Leone from the table. 
26 Exchange rate management is treated in Rolnick and Webber (1989) and Bartolini and Prati 
(1997).  An IMF Staff Paper from the 1970s shows how much the conventional wisdom has 
moved against exchange rate management (Lipschitz 1978). 
27 The well-known Fleming-Mundell model predicts that a fiscal expansion would result in 
exchange rate appreciation.  That analysis is not relevant to most of Africa because the 
countries have no significant level of portfolio flows due to lack of the necessary financial 
institutions.  Theoretical problems in the model are discussed in Weeks 2009b. 
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accompanied by market pressure to weaken the currency.  While the market pressure 
to weaken the exchange rate serves the government’s purpose of increasing 
competitiveness, intervention is potentially necessary to prevent the currency from 
depreciating at a rate that generates unmanageable inflation pressures.28   
 In summary, the exchange rate can be an effective policy instrument for 
supporting a fiscal stimulus, especially important if monetary policy is ineffective.  
This effectiveness is limited by potential inflationary effects.  However, for many 
governments in the sub-Saharan region exchange rate policy is precluded by currency 
arrangements, as discussed in the next section.   
 
4. Feasibility of a Fiscal Stimulus 
 If a government could effectively use all its policy instruments the design of 
the stimulus package would follow the standard textbook prescription:  an increase in 
expenditure or a reduction in taxes would provide the principle demand stimulus;  the 
exchange rate would be managed to prevent deterioration in the external current 
account;  and the fiscal deficit would be financed in part or entirely by public bond 
sales to the private sector to prevent excessive money growth.  For countries that 
export exchange rate inelastic commodities, such as petroleum, currency adjustment 
would affect only imports. 
 However, the policy options facing the governments of the sub-Saharan 
countries are considerably more restricted than this, as Tables 1-4 show.  If we ignore 
restrictions set by donors and lenders, policy space in the sub-Saharan region is 
restricted by two types of constrains, institutional and economic.  As the first column 
of Table 1 shows, very few countries in the region have the basic institutions to 
implement monetary policy.  As summarized in Table 2, seventeen countries were 
part of a common currency zone (fourteen) or operated with an inflexible link to the 
South African rand (three).  Of the twenty-nine countries with national currencies, in 
eighteen governments did not issue bonds, or issued bonds but no formal bond market 
existed.29  For the region as a whole, only eleven of almost fifty countries had 
secondary bond markets and only South Africa had an effective and relatively 
                                                 
28 Exchange rate management in Zambia is discussed in detail in Weeks, et. al. (2007). 
29 The most accessible source for information on monetary institutions and financial markets 
in Africa is the Wharton Financial Institutions Center of the University of Pennsylvania, 
which provides recent reports on almost all countries.  See http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu.  For 
countries in Africa not covered in Wharton studies, websites of central banks were used. 
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efficient resale market.30  For practical purposes, monetary instruments are of little 
use in the sub-Saharan region except for a few countries. 
 Though less limited than monetary policy, exchange rate adjustment is not 
available to a substantial number of sub-Saharan government, because, as noted 
above, fourteen have a common currency.  Three more have chosen to maintain a 
strict link to the rand within the Common Monetary Area.  Of the remaining twenty-
seven, eight operated with adjustable fixed exchange rates and nineteen with managed 
or “flexible” rates.  The majority of these twenty-seven had no bond markets in which 
sterilization operations could be implemented.  For several of the twenty-seven, 
exports would be exchange rate insensitive (e.g., Angola and Nigeria, petroleum 
exporters). 
 With regard to fiscal policy (Table 3), the countries of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union and Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community  (so-called CFA zone) had restrictions on fiscal operations that required 
the governments to balance the annual current budget.  The capital budget could be in 
deficit if the method of finance were specified.  While this arrangement does not 
exclude a fiscal stimulus, in practice it greatly restricts it.  The sin qua non of 
countercyclical intervention is that it can be initiated and terminated quickly in 
response to demand shocks.  Capital expenditures lack this flexibility. 
 In addition to these primary institutional constraints on policy tools, there are 
the secondary ones stressed by the IMF, performance indicators.  Some initial 
conditions would be so unfavorable as to render a stimulus package unwise because it 
would generate macro instability rather than recovery.  In general, a stimulus policy 
should be consistent with a sustainable fiscal balance, manageable external current 
account and inflation which is not destabilizing.  The initial values of these variables 
which are consistent with macroeconomic stability will dependent on the structural 
and behavioral characteristics of each economy and the size of the stimulus to be 
implemented.  In this context, the most important behavioral characteristics are the 
exchange rate elasticity of trade, the propensity to import, the income elasticity of 
public revenue, and the degree of structural inflation. 
                                                 
30 For example, the government of Zambia issues bonds and the Bank of Zambia conducts 
open market operations.  However, the market for these bonds is narrow, limited to a few 
expatriate banks (Weeks, et. al. 2006, Chapter 6). 
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 On the basis of the average import propensity and inflation rates for the 
region, and assuming low elasticities of trade and public revenue, the following 
performance guidelines are proposed.  Prior to the implementation of the stimulus 
package, 
1. the fiscal balance after concessional finance (ODA) should not exceed five 
percent of GDP; 
2. the external current account deficit should be covered by ODA, and foreign 
exchange reserves should be at least three months of imports; and 
3. inflation should not exceed fifteen percent per annum except in the case of a 
fiscal surplus. 
 Table 4 combines these performance constraints with the previously discussed 
institutional limits on policy implementation to identify the stimulus packages that 
would be feasible in the sub-Saharan region.  Whether it would be appropriate to do 
so requires individual country analysis.  For eighteen countries it would be feasible to 
implement a combined fiscal expansion and exchange rate management package.  
Despite its high inflation rate of eighteen percent, Angola is included in this group 
because of the country’s large fiscal and current account surpluses.   
 In most of these countries it would be possible to finance the increased 
expenditure by bond sales because of functioning financial markets. For some, for 
example, Angola, Comoros, Gambia and Tanzania, it would be necessary to monetize 
the increase in the fiscal deficit.  With the exception of South Africa, in none of the 
countries is it likely that foreign exchange operations by the central bank would be a 
safe method of exchange rate management.   
 The practicality of implementing a stimulus is verified by three of these 
countries initiating such packages in 2009 or 2010.31  The IMF supported the counter 
cyclical intervention in Mozambique, even though the government’s fiscal deficit was 
over three percent of GDP and the external current account balance was almost minus 
nine percent of GDP.  Almost all the countries in Table 1 that would use both fiscal 
and exchange rate instruments had smaller negative balances after ODA inflows. 
 For six countries exchange rate management would not possible due to 
currency arrangements, but their fiscal and current account balances allow for fiscal 
expansion (see Table 4).  Fiscal expansion would threaten neither internal nor external 
                                                 




stability.  In ten countries a fiscal expansion would require external concessionary 
finance because of limits on deficit financing.  In ten other countries the performance 
indicators do not justify a stimulus policy. 
 To summarize, in twenty-four of the forty-four countries, over half, a 
domestically financed fiscal stimulus would be feasible and justified by the most 
recent performance indicators.  The performance indicators for ten more countries do 
not preclude a stimulus, but it would require external assistance because of the current 
account impact in the context of exchange rate inflexibility.  Ten countries require 
stabilization program to move towards internal and external balance before a stimulus 
would be sustainable. 
 
  



















Angola NSM  Managed 6.5 19.3 4.2 0.9 18.2 
Benin NCB Constrained WAEMU -0.2 -5.0 7.0 8.3 4.5 
Botswana NSM  Managed 11.4 18.4 21.3 0.7 14.5 
Burkina Faso NCB Constrained WAEMU -5.0 -11.2 na 13.9 2.1 
Burundi NSM  Managed -1.9 -13.7 4.1 46.8 13.5 
Cameroon NCB  CAEMC 4.1 -1.7 5.0 9.4 1.8 
Cape Verde LSM  Fixed (Euro) -2.2 -10.2 3.3 11.7 4.3 
Cen Afr Rep NCB  CAEMC -0.5 -8.2 na 8.8 3.6 
Chad NCB  CAEMC -1.9 -2.0 na 6.5 10.7 
Comoros NSM  Fixed (Euro) -2.0 -5.0 na 7.8 3.7 
Congo DR NSM  Managed -2.0 -26.4 na 21.5 18.1 
Congo, Rep NCB  CAEMC 6.0 -8.0 3.4 3.3 7.5 
Cote d’Ivoire NCB Constrained WAEMU -1.1 1.1 2.8 1.3 5.4 
Eq Guinea NCB  CAEMC 21.0 5.7 na 0.6 19.9 
Eritrea NSM  Fixed (US$) -30.0 -12.0 na 17.4 17.5 
Ethiopia NSM  Managed -7.6 -8.2 2.1 13.7 16.8 
Gabon NCB  CAEMC 14.8 11.0 2.4 0.5 9.7 
Gambia NSM  Managed 0.5 -10.5 4.3 14.3 3.8 
Ghana LSM  Managed -7.3 -11.3 3.2 8.5 5.8 
Guinea NSM  Fixed (US$) -3.3 -8.0 na 5.4 18.0 
Guinea-B NCB Constrained WAEMU -19.1 2.4 na 28.9 5.8 
Kenya LSM  Managed -2.6 -3.5 3.7 4.5 9.0 
Lesotho CMA   CMA (rand) 8.7 8.5 4.8 4.7 7.9 
Liberia NSM  Fixed (US$) 0.3 -28.5 0.6 80.2 12.8 
Madagascar LSM  Managed -2.6 -10.0 2.7 14.8 12.3 
Malawi LSM  Managed -2.5 -5.5 na 21.0 13.4 
Mali NCB Constrained WAEMU 8.0 -6.2 4.6 14.2 6.1 
Mauritania NSM  Managed -5.0 -20.0 na 10.2 15.1 
Mauritius LSM  Fixed (basket) -2.7 -8.8 3.5 0.6 7.3 
Mozambique NSM  Managed -3.4 -9.9 3.8 23.5 8.5 
Namibia LSM  CMA (rand) -4.5 11.2 3.2 2.1 10.6 
Niger NCB Constrained WAEMU 12.5 -8.0 3.3 14.1 5.1 
Nigeria LSM  Managed 0.9 -5.3 9.5 1.7 9.6 
Rwanda LSM  Managed -0.2 15.0 6.8 22.2 11.7 
Senegal NCB Constrained WAEMU -1.5 -10.4 3.6 8.2 4.9 
Seychelles NSM  Fixed (basket) -1.8 -16.3 0.9 0.8 4.2 
Sierra Leone NSM  Managed -5.0 -8.6 4.3 29.4 11.7 
South Africa ESM  Managed 1.5 -7.4 na 0.3 9.0 
Sudan NSM  Managed -0.4 -10.1 1.5 6.1 10.4 
Swaziland NSM, CMA  CMA (rand) -2.8 -4.8 2.8 1.8 6.2 
Tanzania NSM  Managed -3.5 -9.6 5.3 13.7 10.9 
Togo NCB Constrained WAEMU -3.4 -15.3 2.1 4.2 1.8 
Uganda LSM  Managed -1.0 -5.9 6.9 14.7 3.6 

















Notes to Table 1: 
Countries omitted due to incomplete data: Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principle, Somalia and 
Zimbabwe. 
Shaded cells indicate values or characteristics that restrict policy options. 
Indicators (2006-07 or last two years that were available): 
Fiscal deficit is the cash deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
Crr Acc deficit is the current account of the balance of payments as percentage of GDP. 
Forex reserves are central bank holding of foreign exchange measured in months of 
imports. 
ODA/GDP is official development assistance (OECD definition) as percentage of GDP. 
Inflation is the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator. 
The first three cells of the final row give the number of countries out of the total for which each 
policy instrument is feasible.  Fiscal expansion is judged as not feasible if: the fiscal deficit 
exceeds the share of ODA in GDP by more that five percentage points; the current account 
deficit exceeds the ODA share by more than five percentage points; foreign exchange reserves 
are less than three months of imports; and/or inflation exceeds fifteen percent. 
Acronyms:  
The so-called CFA franc zone is the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo).  In addition to 
a common currency the governments of these countries are constrained to balance the current 
account of the public budget.  The capital account can have a deficit if the method of funding 
the deficit is specified.  The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon) also 
has a common currency with a fixed parity to the euro.  Both are commonly called the CFA 
franc. They are not freely interchangeable, except via euro convertibility that is guaranteed by 
the French Treasury, which holds at least sixty-five percent of the pooled reserves of each area. 
CMA is Common Monetary Area, rand (South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland) 
NCB is no central bank, including countries sharing a common central bank. 
NSM is “no secondary market” which includes cases in which the government does not 
issue bonds, issues them but does not sell them on the open market, or sells them but 
there is no secondary (resale) market.   
LSM is “limited secondary market” and refers to the number of buyers and sellers. 
ESM is “effective secondary market”. 
Fiscal deficit includes grants and other revenue on income side. 
 
Sources: 
Monetary institutions: Wharton Financial Institutions Center of the University of Pennsylvania, 
all but Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria and Seychelles, and http://www.afdb.org/en/news-
events/article/donor-workshop-on-african-bond-market-4443/ 
Economic indicators: World Development Indicators 2009 and IMF country reports. 
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Table 2: Sub-Saharan Countries, Monetary Institutions, 2010 
Category Notes 
Common Currency (17) WAEMU, BEAC, CMA 
National currency (27) fixed or managed 
No bond market (16) no bonds or no re-sale market 
Bond market (11) formal re-sale market 
Narrow (10) usually commercial banks only 
Effective (1) South Africa 
 
 
Table 3: Sub-Saharan Countries, Exchange Rate Regimes, 2010 
Category Notes 
Common Currency (17) WAEMU, BEAC, CMA 




(19) 8 with bond market 
 
 
Table 4: Sub-Saharan Countries, Fiscal Policy Summary, Late 2000s 
Category Countries 
1. Excluded from domestic financing 
because constrained to balance current 
budget 
(14) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
2. Excluded by fiscal deficit 
(Fiscal deficit - ODA) < (-5% GDP)* 
 
(2) Eritrea, Ethiopia 
3. Excluded by current account deficit 
(Current account - ODA) < zero* 
 
(4) Guinea, Mauritania, Seychelles, Togo 
4. Excluded by forex reserves 
(Forex reserves) < (3 months of imports) 
 
(3) Liberia, Madagascar, Sudan 
5. Excluded by inflation 
[Inflation over 15%]* 
 
(2) Angola, Congo DR 
Feasible: Domestically financed fiscal 
expansion with exchange rate 
management  
 
(18) Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Feasible: Domestically financed fiscal 
expansion, no exchange rate 
management [fiscal surplus, strong 
current account] 
(6) Cameroon, Eq Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland 
Feasible: Externally financed fiscal 
expansion, no exchange rate 
management  
(10) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cen Afr Rep, Chad, 
Congo Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal 
No stimulus feasible: excluded by fiscal 
deficit, current account deficit or 
inflation 
(10) Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mauritania, 
Seychelles, Togo, Liberia, Madagascar, Sudan, 
Congo DR 
Countries in bold initiated fiscal stimulus in 2009 or 2010. 
*Countries in previous categories excluded. 
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5. Constraints on Macro Policy 
 
 The low level of development of financial institutions renders monetary policy 
ineffective in the vast majority of the sub-Saharan countries.  Common currency 
arrangements further limit the policy options of many governments.  In some 
countries policy options are further limited by size of the fiscal deficit, current 
account imbalance, foreign exchange reserves and inflation. 
 However, as the Freetown Declaration of African finance ministers stated, 
these constraints limit but do not preclude purposeful policy in which governments of 
the region assert themselves as agents of short term recovery and long term 
development.  For a few governments active policy intervention can be done through 
a balance of all the standard instruments, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate.  For a 
majority fiscal policy with domestic deficit financing can be used to re-commission 
the public sector as an agent of change.  In three-quarters of the countries purposeful 
action is consistent with macro stability. 
 However, the governments need donors and the IMF to grant “policy space” 
through the following measures, specified in the Freetown Declaration: 
1) elimination of the pro-cyclical conditionalities and “benchmarks” for deficit 
limits, inflation rates, external borrowing and foreign exchange holdings (all 
explicit in the Declaration); 
2) donor reliability on delivery of assistance because the stimulus policies will 
be “finely tuned” and late or non-delivery of assistance could provoke 
macroeconomic instability; and, more generally, 
3) a suspension of the “business as usual” approach to negotiations over 
development assistance which emphasizes “reform” issues that the external 
crisis has rendered of less immediate importance. 
 The combination of a carefully calibrated stimulus policy and donor flexibility 
offers the firm prospect of overcoming the potentially serious effects of the external 
shocks from the international financial crisis.  While a stimulus package involves 
risks, they are minor compared to the certain effect of the global recession on poverty 
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